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**CCAPACITY BUFFERS:
EXPLAINING THE
RETREAT AND RETURN
OF THE PHILLIPS CURVE**



EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK
EUROSYSTEM

Capacity Buffers: Explaining the Retreat and Return of the Phillips Curve

Clement E. Bohr



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Since the 1960s,

1. Variable and labor costs shares declined
2. Capacity utilization rates declined
3. **Phillips curve flattened**
4. Idiosyncratic volatility of sales increased

During COVID-19,

1. Large increase demand for goods + restriction on production capacity
2. Firms became capacity constrained
3. **Phillips curve steepened**



This Paper

Can the size of firms' **capacity buffers** explain the changing slope of the Phillips curve?

The Capacity Buffer = 1 - Capacity Utilization Rate = measure of distance to capacity constraint

Excess production capacity of capital stock to buffer against demand fluctuations

Buffer size affects slope of supply curve

Fagnart, Licandro, and Sneessens (1997); Boehm and Pandalai-Nayar, (2022)

Larger Buffer → Smaller probability of becoming capacity constrained → flatter supply curve

Theory

Precautionary capacity buffer due to:

- Putty-clay technology → SR capacity constraints
- Idiosyncratic demand shocks

Capacity Buffer Size, B , determines:

- Probability of becoming capacity constrained → **Optimal price** via sales-weighted price elasticity

$$p(B) = \mu(B)W/a_l \text{ with markup } \mu(B) = \frac{\varepsilon(B)}{\varepsilon(B) - 1}$$

$$\varepsilon(B) = \underbrace{\eta(B)}_{\text{price elasticity of sales}} \underbrace{\varepsilon_p}_{\text{price elasticity of demand}} + \underbrace{(1 - \eta(B))}_{\text{sales weighted prob. of becoming capacity constrained}} 0$$

- Volatility in the probability of hitting capacity → **Sensitivity of prices to demand shocks**

Evidence

Prices more sensitivity to **monetary policy shocks** under smaller capacity buffers

Logit Smooth Transition Local Projection Model

$$y_{t+h} = \tau t + F(B_t) \left(\alpha_0^h + \beta_1^h m_t + \gamma_1^h x_t \right) + (1 - F(B_t)) \left(\alpha_0^h + \beta_0^h m_t + \gamma_0^h x_t \right) + u_t$$

small capacity buffers (intercept, shocks, controls) large capacity buffers (intercept, shocks, controls) residuals

- Convex state $F(B)$ depends on capacity buffer size
- RR shocks on monthly aggregate data 1969-2008

Results: When capacity buffers, $B < 15\%$, price responsiveness increases by twice that of output

Table 1: Relative response of consumption prices to quantities across horizons




Horizon (months)		12	18	26	30	36
Any B	P/C	-0.04	-0.13	0.02	0.50	1.21
$B < 15\%$	P/C	0.69	1.34	1.19	1.35	2.64

1. Larger markups → 2. larger capacity buffers → 3. flatter Phillips curve

$$mpk(B) = \underbrace{\mathbb{P}(b = 0|B)}_{\text{Probability of becoming capacity constrained}} \underbrace{a_k(\mu(B) - 1)W/a_l}_{\text{Profits from additional unit of capital}}$$

Exogenous Rise in Markups: μ

- Marginal product of capital rises
- Capacity buffer expands
- Probability of hitting capacity falls
- Volatility in probability of hitting capacity falls
- **Supply curve flattens**







2. Larger capacity buffers → higher demand pass-through into sales → 4. higher idiosyncratic volatility of sales

Sectoral Phillips Correlations

Services

Goods



COVID-19 Sectoral Inflation

Explained by combo of two shocks:

1. Shift in demand from services to goods → Persistent **sectoral taste shock**
2. Restricted capacity from health restrictions → Temporary **capital productivity shock**

Goods Sector:

Increase in demand + decrease in capacity → buffers collapsed → **steep Phillips Correlation**

Services Sector:

Decrease in demand + decrease in capacity → buffers remained → **flat Phillips Correlation**

Aggregate Inflation Decomposition:

- **59% Demand Shift**
- 31% capacity restrictions
- 10% interaction

Total Nonlinear Contribution: 21%