Fiscal Federalism and Monetary Unions

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- Answer important for many countries, for instance
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Next: what are the answers?

Answer from Small Macro Literature on Monetary Unions

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- Centralized authority with fiscal decision making power is *always weakly better*
- Why? As in the work of Chari and Kehoe (2008) and Aguiar et al. (2017)
 - o macro literature presumes that absent externalities, central and local authorities are equally good
 - so even tiny externalities make centralized authority better because it can internalize them
- Idea: if a country in a union increases its nominal debt, it induces the monetary authority to *inflate*
 a decentralized fiscal authority does not take into account the costs of inflation on others
 a centralized fiscal authority does so spends less and leads to less inflation
 hence central authority always better because it internalizes these externalities
- Main takeaway from this literature: *no benefit* to decentralized authority

Answer from Large Micro Literature on Fiscal Federalism

• Local authority is better unless fiscal externalities are fairly high

Answer from *Large* Micro Literature on Fiscal Federalism

- Local authority is better unless fiscal externalities are fairly high
- Why? As in the work of Oates (1972)
 - o micro literature presumes that absent externalities, local authorities are much better
 - o so need substantial externalities before centralized authority is better
- Idea: local authorities are better at tailoring policies to the tastes of local citizens
 - $\circ~$ Oates (1972)'s approach: verbally presumes locals have better information
 - o recent literature: micro-founded approach that similarly argues local authority is superior
 - $\circ~$ so local authorities preferred unless there are large externalities
- Main takeaway from this literature: in general large benefits to decentralized authority

- This paper: we isolate the circumstances under which centralization is preferable to decentralization
- We do so by contrasting two forces
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- Benefit of centralization: a central fiscal authority internalizes the inflationary cost of debt

Overview

- Real model as in Oates (1972) [Berriel et al. (forthcoming)]
 - o Oates Decentralization Theorem: absent externalities, local authorities are strictly better
 - Cutoff Rule: for a class of externalities, centralized authorities better iff union is sufficiently large
- This paper: monetary model with nominal debt as in macro literature
 - Generalized Decentralization Theorem: under commitment by MA, local authorities are strictly better
 - Cutoff Rule: without commitment, centralized authorities better if union is sufficiently large
- In sum: existing macro literature argues centralization is always better, we find not true
- Important implications for the debate on the EU enlargement
 - $\circ~$ the degree of optimal delegation of fiscal authority should adjust as EU enlarges
 - future work: all else equal, adding smaller countries less attractive than adding larger ones

Two-Period Monetary Union: Overview

- Each region/country $i \in I$ has a representative consumer and a local fiscal authority
- There is a union-wide central fiscal authority (fiscal union)
- Fiscal authorities (local or central) choose level of nominal debt

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- Fiscal authorities (local or central) choose level of nominal debt
- Timing
 - \circ in period 1, governments finance spending with nominal debt
 - \circ in period 2, governments must pay real value of their nominal debt with distortionary labor taxes
- Monetary authority chooses inflation
 - $\circ\ costs$ of inflation: productivity is decreasing with inflation
 - \circ benefits of inflation
 - * under commitment: none
 - * no commitment: ex-post inflation erodes real value of nominal debt and lowers distortions from taxation

Firm Problem: Inflation Cost

- Throughout the monetary policy instrument is inflation $\pi = p_2/p_1$ with $p_1 = 1$ ($\pi \ge 1$ is feasible)
- Firms in country *i* have a fixed amount of money *M* to buy inputs *x* that enhance productivity A(x)
- Firm problem

$$\max_{x_i,\ell_i} [A(x_i)\ell_i - w_i\ell_i]$$
 subject to $x_i \leq M/\pi$

• Think of last constraint as "cash-in-advance" constraint (with timing as in Nicolini (1998))

• So in equilibrium

$$w = A(x_i)$$
 and $x_i = \frac{M}{\pi}$

• Cost of inflation: directly decreases real input $x_i = M/\pi$ and hence decreases productivity

Government Budget Constraint

• Country *i*'s government budget

• period 1: to finance g_i the government issues claim to B_i dollars in period 2 at price 1/(1+R) so

$$g_i = \frac{B_i}{1+R}$$

• period 2: collects tax revenues $\tau_i w \ell_i$ to repay real debt B_i / π so

$$au_i w \ell_i = rac{B_i}{\pi}$$

- Under no commitment: this is the source of benefits to inflation
- Under commitment: no such benefit since monetary authority cannot affect ex-post real rate

Consumer Problem

- Two ways to save
 - buy nominal debt d_i or store real assets k_i with technology that has fixed real return r
- Period 1: endowment y_1 , consume and save, and get utility from public goods
- Period 2: supply labor, consume, and get returns on savings and labor
- Consumer problem

$$\max_{k_i,d_i,\ell_i} \{ u(c_{1i}) + \theta_i h(g_i) + \beta u \left[c_{2i} - v(\ell_i) \right] \}$$

where

$$c_{1i} = y_1 - d_i - k_i$$
 and $c_{2i} = (1 - \tau_i)w\ell_i + (1 + r)k_i + (1 + R)\frac{d_i}{\pi}$

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• Taste θ for government spending is $\theta \in {\theta_H, \theta_L}$ with $q_H = \Pr(\theta_H), q_L = \Pr(\theta_L)$ and mean μ_{θ}

Information Structure of Local and Central Fiscal Authority

- Local authority: perfectly observes $\theta_i \in \{\theta_H, \theta_L\}$
- Central authority: observes noisy symmetric signal $s_i \in \{s_H, s_L\}$ with informativeness $\phi \in [1/2, 1]$

$$\phi = \Pr(s_H | \theta_H) = \Pr(s_L | \theta_L)$$

- If $\phi = 1$: signal perfectly informative in that $E(\theta_i | s_i) = \theta_i$
- But if $\phi = 1/2$: signal informative in that $E(\theta_i | s_i) = \mu_{\theta}$

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- If $\phi = 1$: signal perfectly informative in that $E(\theta_i | s_i) = \theta_i$
- But if $\phi = 1/2$: signal informative in that $E(\theta_i | s_i) = \mu_{\theta}$
- For general ϕ use Bayes' rule so observing, say, s_H shifts posterior towards θ_H

$$E(\theta|s_H) = \frac{q_H\phi}{q_H\phi + q_L(1-\phi)}\theta_H + \frac{q_L(1-\phi)}{q_H\phi + q_L(1-\phi)}\theta_L$$

Idea: local authority tries to communicate θ_i but this type of communication difficult
 e.g. preferences over complex policies are nearly impossible to fully specify

Consumer Problem

• Consumer problem

$$\max_{k_i,d_i,\ell_i} \{ u(c_{1i}) + \theta_i h(g_i) + \beta u \left[c_{2i} - v(\ell_i) \right] \}$$

where

with FOC

$$c_{1i} = y_1 - d_i - k_i$$
 and $c_{2i} = (1 - \tau_i)w\ell_i + (1 + r)k_i + (1 + R)\frac{d_i}{\pi}$
 $v'(\ell_i) = A(1 - \tau_i)$

- Convenient to change control of government from tax rates τ_i to tax revenues T_i
- We do so by multiplying the FOC for labor by ℓ_i and using that $T_i = A \tau_i \ell_i$

$$\ell_i: \quad \ell_i v'(\ell_i) = A(1-\tau_i)\ell_i = A\ell_i - T_i$$

• To express the implied optimal ℓ_i as $\ell_i = \ell(T_i, A)$ rather than $\ell(\tau_i, A)$

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Monetary Authority with Commitment

- Timing
 - monetary authority moves first, before any information or signal is realized and chooses π
 all other agents then move, taking π as given
- Lack of arbitrage between nominal and real assets by consumers implies Fisher equation

$$1+r = \frac{1+R}{\pi}$$

- \circ no effect from π on real return on nominal bonds
- $\circ~$ as π changes, nominal rate adjusts so real return on bonds constant
- What are the costs and benefits of inflation?
 - costs: inflation decreases productivity $A(M/\pi)$
 - $\circ~$ benefits: none since inflation cannot affect the ex-post real rate on nominal debt

Results With Commitment

- Optimal inflation rate is zero ($\pi^* = 1$)
- Monetary economy is then equivalent to a real economy *without* externalities
- Generalized Decentralization Theorem immediately applies
- Result
 - $\circ~$ If signals not perfectly informative ($\phi<1$), a decentralized regime yields higher ex-ante welfare than fiscal union
 - \circ The difference in welfare between regimes increases as the informativeness of signal decreases
- Contrast with results by Chari and Kehoe (2008) and Aguiar et al. (2017)
 - under commitment a centralized regime ties a decentralized regime

Monetary Authority without Commitment

- Timing: monetary authority moves after nominal debt decisions, so time-inconsistency problem
- Period 1
 - $\circ\;$ preferences and signals about them are realized
 - $\circ\;$ consumers and government choose spending, nominal debt and savings
- Period 2
 - monetary authority chooses π facing states $\overline{B} = (B_1, \ldots, B_I)$ and $\overline{k} = (k_1, \ldots, k_I)$
 - $\circ~$ government chooses taxes on labor to pay for its real debt
 - \circ consumers choose labor according to $\ell(T_i, A)$ with $T_i = B_i / \pi$
- What are the costs and benefits to inflation?
 - costs: inflation decrease productivity $A(M/\pi)$
 - benefits: real value of nominal debt \downarrow and hence distortions on labor from $T_i = B_i/\pi$ to pay for it

Indirect Fiscal Externality: Lack of Commitment by Monetary Authority

- Given utility is additively separable, the optimal choice for inflation by the monetary authority
 - $\circ~$ does not depend on countries' preference types or information
 - \circ but rather only on states (\bar{B}, \bar{k}) and value of period-2 utility
- Monetary authority problem with $c_{2i} = A\ell_i + (1+r)k_i$, $\ell_i = \ell(T_i, A)$, $A = A(M/\pi)$ and $T_i = B_i/\pi$

$$W_{MA}(\bar{B}, \bar{k}) = \max_{\pi \ge 1} \frac{1}{I} \sum_{i=1}^{I} u [c_{2i} - v(\ell_i)]$$

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- Why does this generate an *indirect* fiscal externality in a decentralized regime? Idea
 - it is indirect because government *i*'s actions do not *directly* enter country *j*'s utility or productivity
 - \circ it arises because government of *i* understands its actions affect monetary policy in that

$$rac{\partial \hat{\pi}(ar{B},ar{k})}{\partial B_i}$$
 and $rac{\partial \hat{\pi}(ar{B},ar{k})}{\partial k_i}$

• but country *i* does not care about the inflation it induces in other countries

- Key to externality: what fiscal authority anticipates the monetary authority will do in two regimes
- For simplicity, let u(c) = c, then problem of monetary authority is

$$W_{MA}(\bar{B},\bar{k}) = \max_{\pi \ge 1} \frac{1}{I} \sum_{i=1}^{I} \left[A\ell(B_i/\pi,A) - \nu(\ell(B_i/\pi,A)) + (1+r)k_i \right], \qquad A = A(M/\pi)$$

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 \circ Notation: the part of the objective function that encodes benefits and costs of inflation for any level of *B* is

$$F(B,\pi) = A(M/\pi)\ell(B/\pi, A(M/\pi))) - \nu(\ell(B/\pi, A(M/\pi)))$$

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- Assume taste θ_i is perfectly correlated across countries, so preferences are identical
- In centralized regime: fiscal authority chooses same *B* for all *i* so MA faces a symmetric history
- Hence fiscal authority anticipates that MA will choose optimal inflation $\hat{\pi}^{C}(B)$ to solve

 $F_{\pi}(B,\pi)=0$

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$$W_{MA}(\bar{B},\bar{k}) = \max_{\pi \ge 1} \frac{1}{I} \sum_{i=1}^{I} \left[\underbrace{A\ell(B_i/\pi,A) - v(\ell(B_i/\pi,A))}_{F(B_i,\pi)} + (1+r)k_i \right], \qquad A = A(M/\pi)$$

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- Assume taste θ_i is perfectly correlated across countries, so preferences are identical
- In decentralized regime: taking as given symmetric choices by others B_{-i} , MA faces *almost symmetric* history
- Hence fiscal authority anticipates that MA will choose optimal inflation $\hat{\pi}^D(B_i, B_{-i})$ to solve $F_{\pi}(B_i, \pi) + (I-1)F_{\pi}(B_{-i}, \pi) = 0$

Elasticity of Inflation to Change in Debt in the Two Regimes

• Centralized regime: optimal inflation policy $\pi^{C}(B)$ is defined by the FOC

 $F_{\pi}(B,\pi)=0$

• differentiate it to get so

$$rac{\partial \pi^C(B)}{\partial B} = -rac{F_{\pi B}}{F_{\pi \pi}}$$

• MA takes into account that if it changes π because of one country changing B_i , it hurts all others

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- MA takes into account that if it changes π because of one country changing B_i , it hurts all others
- Decentralized regime: optimal inflation policy $\pi^D(B_i; B_{-i}, I)$ is defined by the FOC

$$F_{\pi}(B_i,\pi) + (I-1)F_{\pi}(B_{-i},\pi) = 0$$

 \circ differentiate it to get

$$\left. \frac{\partial \pi^D(B_i; B_{-i}, I)}{\partial B_i} \right|_{B_i = B_{-i} = B} = -\frac{1}{I} \frac{F_{\pi B}}{F_{\pi \pi}}$$

• local authority anticipates smaller change in π if *it alone increases debt than when central authority increases all debt*

Debt Elasticity of Inflation in the Two Regimes and Fiscal Externality

• The elasticities under the centralized and decentralized regimes are


$$\eta^{C} = \frac{B}{\pi} \frac{\partial \pi^{C}(B)}{\partial B}$$
 and $\eta^{D}(I) = \frac{B}{\pi} \frac{\partial \pi^{D}(B_{i}; B_{-i}, I)}{\partial B_{i}}|_{B_{i}=B_{-i}=B}$

• Key to fiscal externality is


$$\eta^D(I) = \frac{1}{I} \eta^C$$

- Given anticipation of what MA will do, consider fiscal authority's decentralized choice of B_i
- Because each decentralized authority only cares about itself
 - \circ it *internalizes only fraction* 1/I of total costs it imposes on union as a whole
 - \circ so, it issues too much debt and causes too much inflation: $\eta^{D}(I) = \eta^{C}/I$


• Central: will pick $B_i = B$ for all *i* so incoming debt is (B, \ldots, B) and MA policy is $\pi^C(B)$



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- Local: given others pick $B_j = B$, incoming debt is $(B_i; B, ..., B)$ and MA policy is $\pi^D(B_i, B_{-i})$



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


• This implies that when a decentralized fiscal authority increases its own debt

 $\circ\;$ it receives all of the benefits from the increase in spending but it only induces a small increase in inflation

o much different trade-off than the centralized fiscal authority faces when deciding on all debt


- Central: will pick $B_i = B$ for all *i* so incoming debt is (B, \ldots, B) and MA policy is $\pi^C(B)$
- Local: given others pick $B_j = B$, incoming debt is $(B_i; B, \ldots, B)$ and MA policy is $\pi^D(B_i, B_{-i})$




Next: this different trade-off is at the heart of the free-rider problem

- For a class of distortions from inflation embedded in $A(M/\pi)$: obtain following result
- Result: A Cutoff Rule for Optimal Delegation. For any given degree of informativeness ϕ
 - either there exists a finite cutoff $I(\phi)$, such that a fiscal union is preferred if $I > I(\phi)$
 - \circ or a decentralized regime is preferred for all I

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• Moreover, the cutoff $I(\phi)$ decreases with the informativeness of the signal, ϕ


Case of Independent Preferences Across Countries: No Commitment

- Illustrate results with an example
- Let u(c) = c, $h(g) = \log g$, $v(\ell) = \ell^{1+1/\eta}/(1+1/\eta)$ and

$$A(M/\pi) = a + d\left(\frac{M}{\pi} - 1\right) - \frac{e}{2}\left(\frac{M}{\pi} - 1\right)^2$$


- Similar intuition as in the perfectly correlated case
 - but borrowing differs across countries depending on their realized preferences or signals

Case of Independent Preferences Across Countries: No Commitment



• Under better information ($\phi = 0.9$), centralized authority preferred if $I \ge 3$ preferred if $I \ge 8$

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
- Under better information ($\phi = 0.9$), centralized authority preferred if $I \ge 3$
- Under worse information ($\phi = 0.5$), centralized authority preferred if $I \ge 8$

[comparative statics]

Conclusion


- Show how insights from fiscal federalism change principles of delegation from existing macro lit.
 - $\circ~$ optimal delegation does not just depend on whether externalities exist or not
 - instead it depends on the trade-off between externalities and natural advantage of local authorities
 so no "one size fits all" rule applies to delegation
- Implications for design of monetary union
 - $\circ~$ more sophisticated trade-offs than in current macro literature
 - key new idea: centralization optimal only if monetary union sufficiently large
- Analysis has implications for enlargement policies: all else equal, countries are less attractive when
 - they are *smaller* because they internalize a smaller percentage of costs they impose (assuming utilitarian MA)
 - they are prone to issuing more debt (fast growing or less patient countries)

As Labor Elasticity Falls So Does Fiscal Externality



- Utility from working is given by $v(\ell) = \ell^{1+\frac{1}{\eta}}/(1+\frac{1}{\eta})$
- Elasticity η decreases from 1 to 0.9: as taxes are less distortionary, incentives to increase π decrease
- Fiscal externality becomes less important, which gives an advantage to decentralization
- Hence the *cutoff for when centralization is better is larger*, $I^* = 15$

As Productivity Distortions Fall Fiscal Externality Worsens



- Productivity is given by $A(M/\pi) = a + d(M/\pi 1) \frac{e}{2}(M/\pi 1)^2$
- Here d decreases from 0.15 to 0.05: borrowing increases as FA's anticipate lower distortions from π
- Fiscal externality becomes worse due to increase in borrowing: gives an advantage to centralization
- Hence the *cutoff for when centralization is better is smaller*, $I^* = 6$