Inte tillgängligt på svenska
Cristina Bodea
- 21 October 2010
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 120Details
- Abstract
- Central bank independence is a common feature in advanced economies. Delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank with a clear mandate for price stability has proven to be successful in keeping a check on inflation and providing a trusted currency. However, it is also a fact that central banks in most countries have regular contacts with the government and cooperate with them on a number of issues. This paper looks into the various forms of cooperation between central banks and governments in the G7. The focus is on those central banks that exercise a monetary policy decision-making function, i.e. the ECB and the central banks of the four G7 countries outside the euro area (the US, UK, Japan and Canada). The paper first reviews the objectives of and arrangements for central bank/government cooperation in the US, UK, Japan and Canada in areas such as monetary policy and its interlink with economic policy; foreign exchange operations and foreign reserve management; international cooperation; payment systems/securities learing and settlement systems; upervision, regulation and financial stability; banknotes and coins; collection of statistics; and the role of fiscal agent for the government. In parallel the paper looks into the objectives of and arrangements for cooperation between the ECB and relevant European counterparts, reflecting the specific European institutional environment characterised by the absence of a
- JEL Code
- D83 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge, Communication, Belief
C62 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Mathematical Methods, Programming Models, Mathematical and Simulation Modeling→Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
E30 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→General