Nie je k dispozícii v slovenčine.
Mathieu Simoens
- 24 March 2025
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 3041Details
- Abstract
- We examine whether loan portfolio sectoral specialization provides informational advantages to banks, enabling better credit risk assessment. Using euro area credit register data, we compare probabilities of default assigned by specialized and non-specialized banks to the same borrowing firm several quarters before the borrower defaults. We find that banks specialized in the borrower’s sector are better in predicting future defaults. This is mostly driven by specialized banks actively raising probabilities of default earlier, not by higher probabilities of default when loans are issued. As a result, specialized banks also increase provisions to these borrowers. We do not observe differences in credit risk assessment towards healthy borrowers, suggesting that the effect is not attributable to general conservatism but to more accurate evaluation of credit risk in the sectors of banks’ specialization. Our results are more pronounced for smaller firms and when banks do not have long-term relationships with their defaulting borrowers.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
D82 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Asymmetric and Private Information, Mechanism Design
- 27 May 2024
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2943Details
- Abstract
- Amid the growing financial vulnerabilities posed by climate change, we investigate macroprudential capital buffers to mitigate systemic risks and increase the resilience of the banking sector. Leveraging granular data and state-of-the-art stress testing methods, we quantify potential bank losses attributed to climate-related transition risks. Focusing on short-term transition scenarios, we document a significant variance among banks in their risk exposure, with the most exposed institutions being those characterized by lower excess capital. Subsequently, we introduce a methodological framework for tailoring bank-specific buffer requirements to cover these losses, offering macroprudential authorities a practical method for calibrating climate-related macroprudential capital buffers, complementing microprudential policies. While we focus our application on transition risks, the framework can be extended to capture all climate risks in general. The study demonstrates the potential of macroprudential capital buffers to mitigate potential climate-related losses and contributes to the understanding of the appropriate prudential policy response to these challenges.
- JEL Code
- E61 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Policy Objectives, Policy Designs and Consistency, Policy Coordination
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
Q54 : Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics, Environmental and Ecological Economics→Environmental Economics→Climate, Natural Disasters, Global Warming