Nu este disponibil în limba română
Quentin Vandeweyer
- 15 April 2020
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 69Details
- Abstract
- How does the presence of “shadow banks” – non-bank, unregulated financial intermediaries – affect the ability of central banks to tackle a liquidity crisis? To address this question, we develop an asset pricing model with both bank and non-bank financial institutions. A crucial part of the model is that banks intermediate liquidity between the central bank and non-banks, but this intermediation stops during a financial crisis. Non-banks are then left without a lender-of-last-resort, and central bank liquidity operations with banks are not sufficient to mitigate the crisis. In our stylized model, opening liquidity facilities to non-banks and purchasing illiquid assets are then essential measures to tackle a liquidity crisis.
- JEL Code
- E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 2 January 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2350Details
- Abstract
- This paper investigates the efficiency of various monetary policy instruments to stabilize asset prices in a liquidity crisis. We propose a macro-finance model featuring both traditional and shadow banks subject to funding risk. When banks are well capitalized, they have access to money markets and efficiently mitigate funding shocks. When aggregate bank capital is low, a vicious cycle arises between declining asset prices and funding risks. The central bank can partially counter these dynamics. Increasing the supply of reserves reduces liquidity risk in the traditional banking sector, but fails to reach the shadow banking sector. When the shadow banking sector is large, as in the US in 2008, the central bank can further stabilize asset prices by directly purchasing illiquid securities.
- JEL Code
- E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 23 August 2019
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 229Details
- Abstract
- As a result of technological advancements, instant delivery of digital services has become the norm in today’s society. Yet, until recently, this trend did not extend to retail payment services, which normally took one or up to a few working days from the end user's perspective. Following Europe’s recent launch of its own SEPA-wide instant payment platform, now is the time to ask the question: will instant payment services become “the new normal” and what would this new normal look like? This paper assesses the overall prospects of instant payments in the euro area. It identifies structural drivers and blockers to the adoption of instant payments based on the analysis of country cases where instant payments became operational in the last few years.
- JEL Code
- E41 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Demand for Money
E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies