Niet beschikbaar in het Nederlands
Luis Molestina Vivar
- 30 July 2024
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2963Details
- Abstract
- This paper examines the use of ETFs by open-ended investment funds in the euro area to manage liquidity. We find that during the COVID-19 market turmoil, investment funds were the most run-prone investor type in the market for ETFs. We also show that open-ended funds that faced larger outflows in March 2020 scaled down their ETF holdings by a larger amount. These results are consistent with open-ended funds passing on their outflows to the ETF shares they held. Since open-ended investment funds are the largest group of ETF investors in the euro area, their trading can materially impact primary ETF flows during times of stress.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
- 18 June 2024
- FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND STRUCTURE BOXFinancial Integration and Structure in the Euro Area 2024Details
- Abstract
- The issuance of these temporary recovery instruments has renewed the discussion on the benefits of a common safe asset and their transformative potential for EU financial integration. Given that a common safe asset may foster financial integration in the euro area by facilitating diversification and de-risking banks’ sovereign portfolios, this box assesses the extent to which these newly issued EU bonds (i) are perceived by market participants as a common safe asset, and (ii) can facilitate diversification and affect banks’ sovereign portfolio composition.
- JEL Code
- G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
H63 : Public Economics→National Budget, Deficit, and Debt→Debt, Debt Management, Sovereign Debt
- 16 May 2024
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - BOXFinancial Stability Review Issue 1, 2024Details
- Abstract
- Recent stress episodes have shown how leverage in the non-bank financial intermediation (NBFI) sector can be a source of systemic risk and amplify stress in the wider financial system. Prominent examples of leverage-related risk in the NBFI sector include the role of leveraged hedge funds in the US Treasury market in March 2020, liability-driven investment funds in UK gilt markets in September 2022 and the failure of Archegos Capital Management in March 2021. In response to these events, policymakers around the world have launched a range of initiatives to contain risks from leverage in the NBFI sector more broadly. A key takeaway from these recent experiences and policy initiatives is that no single tool can be uniformly applied to address risks stemming from NBFI leverage. An effective policy response requires a broad range of tools to be made available, which should be appropriately tailored to the specific circumstances and can serve as complements to each other. Given the significant cross-border and cross-sector dimension of these risks, close coordination and cooperation between various authorities is essential, ensuring that risks are addressed from a system-wide perspective.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 12 April 2024
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2924Details
- Abstract
- Investment funds hold a disproportionately larger fraction of domestic relative to foreign stocks. Stock market development and familiarity (language and distance) are considered key determinants for home bias. The literature neglects however that investors often invest in foreign funds domiciled in financial centers. We use a “look-through approach” to account for this misclassification. First, we find substantially smaller home bias estimates compared to those in the literature. Second, the explanatory power of plausible home bias determinants is lower than previously documented. Third, familiarity only plays a meaningful role when investors are households, highlighting the role of investor sophistication.
- JEL Code
- G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
- 6 June 2023
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2825Details
- Abstract
- Using a sample of open-end corporate bond funds domiciled in the euro area, we exploit the COVID-19 market turmoil in March 2020 to examine two channels through which liquidity buffers can reduce procyclicality in the investment fund sector. First, we find that liquidity buffers reduced outflows during March 2020 only to a limited extent. Second, we find that funds entering the crisis with higher liquidity buffers were less likely to involve in cash hoarding and more likely to use cash buffers to meet outflows. Our results suggest that higher liquidity buffers can reduce procyclicality primarily through supporting the liquidity management strategies employed by fund managers.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
- 16 November 2022
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - BOXFinancial Stability Review Issue 2, 2022Details
- Abstract
- This box assesses the development of the liquidity mismatch for a broad sample of euro area open-ended bond funds. This mismatch arises if funds primarily invest in less liquid assets while at the same time offering their investors the option of short-term redemptions. In 2017 the Financial Stability Board (FSB) published policy recommendations to address structural vulnerabilities related to asset management activities, including liquidity mismatch. Our results suggest that the liquidity mismatch increased in the years up to the pandemic. In March 2020 many funds faced substantial redemption pressures, especially those with a relatively large structural liquidity mismatch, creating large fire-sale externalities. The increase in cash holdings after this shock indicates procyclicality in liquidity management strategies, suggesting that fund managers do not necessarily have the incentives to maintain sufficient liquidity buffers. Policies that aim to better align redemption terms with asset liquidity would help to enhance the resilience of the investment fund sector, as the liquidity mismatch is still prevalent and has not declined since the publication of the FSB policy recommendations in 2017.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
- 5 October 2022
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2737Details
- Abstract
- The market turmoil in March 2020 highlighted key vulnerabilities in the EU money market fund (MMF) sector. This paper assesses the effectiveness of the EU's regulatory framework from a financial stability perspective, based on a panel analysis of EU MMFs at a daily frequency. First, we find that investment in private debt assets exposes MMFs to liquidity risk. Second, we find that low volatility net asset value (LVNAV) funds, which invest in non-public debt assets while offering a stable NAV, face higher redemptions than other fund types. The risk of breaching the regulatory NAV limit may have incentivised outflows among some LVNAV investors in March 2020. Third, MMFs with lower levels of liquidity buffers use their buffers less than other funds, suggesting low levels of buffer usability in stress periods. Our findings suggest fragility in the EU MMF sector and call for a strengthened regulatory framework of private debt MMFs.
- JEL Code
- G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 21 January 2022
- MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - FOCUS - No. 16Details
- Abstract
- This impact assessment shows that a mandatory public debt holding would reduce the liquidity risk of private debt money market funds by increasing their shock absorption capacity and diversifying their asset liquidity profile. This would enable these funds to better mitigate the externalities associated with large-scale redemptions. The analysis also considers possible costs related to the funding of non-financial corporations and the attractiveness of MMFs as well as possible feasibility issues in terms of the supply of public debt.
- JEL Code
- G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
- 21 January 2022
- MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 16Details
- Abstract
- This article assesses proposed reforms to the European Money Market Funds (MMF) Regulation to enhance the resilience of the sector. Specifically, the article provides a rationale for requiring private debt MMFs to hold higher levels of liquid assets, of which a part should be public debt, and considers the design and calibration of such a requirement. The article also proposes that the impediments to the use of liquidity buffers should be removed and authorities should have a role in releasing these buffers. Finally, while the removal of a stable net asset value for low-volatility MMFs would reduce cliff effects, we argue that this might not be necessary if liquidity requirements for these private debt MMFs are sufficiently strengthened.
- JEL Code
- G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
- 12 April 2021
- MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 12Details
- Abstract
- Following the onset of the coronavirus (COVID‑19) crisis, a significant number of European investment funds suspended redemptions. We find that many of those funds had invested in illiquid assets, were leveraged or had lower cash holdings than funds that were not suspended. Furthermore, suspensions were more likely to be seen in jurisdictions where pre-emptive liquidity measures were not available. Our findings also suggest that suspensions have spillover effects on other funds and sectors, highlighting the importance of pre-emptive liquidity management measures.
- JEL Code
- G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
- 12 April 2021
- MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 12Details
- Abstract
- The turmoil seen in March 2020 highlighted key vulnerabilities in the money market fund (MMF) sector. This article assesses the effectiveness of the EU’s regulatory framework from a financial stability perspective and identifies three important lessons. First, investment in non-public debt assets exposes MMFs to liquidity risk, highlighting the need to limit investment in illiquid assets. Second, low-volatility net asset value (LVNAV) funds are particularly vulnerable to liquidity shocks, given that they invest in non-public debt assets while offering a stable net asset value (NAV). Enhanced portfolio requirements could strengthen their liquidity profile. And third, MMFs seem reluctant to draw down on their liquidity buffers during periods of stress, suggesting a need to make buffers more usable.
- JEL Code
- G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
- 25 May 2020
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - BOXFinancial Stability Review Issue 1, 2020Details
- Abstract
- Euro area money market funds (MMFs) provide short-term credit to banks and non-financial corporations (NFCs) through purchases of commercial paper (CP). MMFs also play an important role in non-banks’ cash and liquidity management, given that the funds offer stable value and the possibility to redeem at short notice. As the coronavirus crisis deepened, euro area MMFs experienced large outflows and a number of them had difficulties in raising sufficient cash from maturing assets and liquid positions. Stress in MMFs can impair the financial system’s and the real economy’s access to short-term funding and liquidity during crises. Monetary policy action helped to improve financial market conditions more broadly, thereby also alleviating liquidity strains in the MMF sector.
- JEL Code
- G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
- 19 May 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2413Details
- Abstract
- Does leverage drive investor flows in bond mutual funds? Leverage can increase fund returns in good times, but it can also magnify investors’ losses and their response to bad performance. We study bond fund flows to provide new evidence for the link between mutual fund leverage and financial fragility. We find that outflows are greater in leveraged funds during stressed periods and after bad performance, compared with unleveraged funds. We provide supporting evidence that leverage exacerbates the negative externality in investors' redemption decisions. In this regard, we find that fund managers in leveraged funds react more procyclically to net outflows compared with fund managers in unleveraged funds. Such procyclical security sales in leveraged funds may increase investors’ first-mover advantages and their response to bad performance. These findings suggest that leverage amplifies fragility in the bond mutual fund sector.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
- 3 March 2020
- FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND STRUCTURE ARTICLEFinancial Integration and Structure in the Euro Area 2020Details
- Abstract
- This special feature analyses euro area investment preferences in the investment fund sector and discusses the implications for financial integration. We investigate the traditional perception that investors tend to hold a disproportionate share of domestic assets in their portfolio, a phenomenon generally known as “home bias”. We argue that measures of home bias that neglect fund holders’ countries of origin are biased, in particular when investments are concentrated in financial centres. By taking into account fund holders’ country of origin rather than assuming the fund’s domicile as investment origin, this study revisits and corrects measures of home bias in the euro area.
- 3 March 2020
- FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND STRUCTURE ARTICLEFinancial Integration and Structure in the Euro Area 2020Details
- Abstract
- This special feature discusses how a common sovereign safe asset in the euro area could benefit financial stability by fostering financial integration and development, and by changing the structure of asset markets. The discussion focuses on the potential benefits of a well-designed common safe asset that has certain desirable characteristics, while it does not provide an assessment of specific design options. This special feature should be viewed as part of a broader discussion on how to complete the banking union, which also includes considerations regarding a European deposit insurance scheme and changing the regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures.
- 29 October 2019
- MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 9Details
- Abstract
- A recent ECB study shows that leverage is an important driver in investors’ redemption decisions. Regulatory changes to the UCITS framework facilitated the use of derivatives, increasing leverage for some European mutual funds which amplified investors' responsiveness to negative returns in a procyclical manner.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 30 November 2017
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 202Details
- Abstract
- This joint ECB-DNB Occasional Paper aims to inform the ongoing discussions about an EU-level framework for operationalising macroprudential leverage limits for alternative investment funds (AIFs). It builds on, and extends, the analysis of an ECB-DNB special feature article published in the ECB’s Financial Stability Review in November 2016. First, this Occasional Paper presents new EU-level evidence suggesting that leveraged funds exhibit stronger sensitivity of investor outflows to bad past performance than unleveraged funds, which has the potential to exacerbate systemic risk. Second, it devises a framework for assessing financial stability risks from leverage in investment funds. This is applied to leveraged AIFs managed by asset managers in the Netherlands using Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) data for the two-year period from the first quarter of 2015 to the fourth quarter of 2016. Third, it discusses the potential effectiveness and efficiency of various designs for macroprudential leverage limits. To this end, it builds on the findings for the Dutch AIF sector and suggests design options for further exploration at EU level. Beyond assessing financial stability risks from leverage in the Dutch AIF sector, the case study aims to show how equivalent information on AIFs at the European level – which will be made available to the European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA) and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) in the coming years – could be used when developing an EU-level framework for operationalising macroprudential leverage limits.
- JEL Code
- G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
E61 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Policy Objectives, Policy Designs and Consistency, Policy Coordination
- 24 November 2016
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLETowards a Framework for Calibrating Macroprudential Leverage Limits for Alternative Investment FundsFinancial Stability Review Issue 2, 2016Details
- Abstract
- Alternative investment funds (AIFs) in Europe operate without regulatory leverage limits. Competent authorities within the EU have the legal power to impose macroprudential leverage limits on AIFs, but no authority has implemented this tool so far. This joint European Central Bank-De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) special feature (i) presents a macroprudential case for limiting the use of leverage by investment funds, (ii) develops a framework to inform the design and calibration of macroprudential leverage limits to contain the build-up of leverage-related systemic risks by AIFs, and (iii) discusses different design and calibration options. By way of example, it uses supervisory information on AIFs managed by asset managers based in the Netherlands. The article concludes by recommending a way forward to develop an EU-level framework for a harmonised implementation of macroprudential leverage limits for AIFs, which forms a key part of the agenda of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) to develop macroprudential policy beyond banking.
- JEL Code
- G00 : Financial Economics→General→General